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NOTES
of the stream when following the channels of the river,23 thereby
making it rather difficult to ascertain how much time was spent
in a particular state. In the writer's opinion this case estab-
lishes an entirely new angle as to the rights of the states to tax,
and it brushes aside the belief than an actual situs must first be
proved in order to deprive the domiciliary state of her tax
rights, in favor of a doctrine which merely requires the possi-
bility of taxation by other states on an apportionment basis.
Robert Lee Curry III
TORTS-LIABILITY OF AUTOMOBILE OWNER FOR
DRIVER'S NEGLIGENCE
Defendant and his friend, after eating dinner at the home
of a relative of defendant, drove to a liquor store in defendant's
automobile and purchased whiskey to be used in making egg
nog. During their return to the relative's residence, defendant
permitted the friend to drive the car, as the latter had never
operated an automobile equipped with overdrive and "he wanted
to see how it handled." The friend, in the course of the journey,
negligently struck plaintiff's car and the plaintiff brought suit
to recover damages. Held, negligence of the driver was im-
puted to defendant owner, inasmuch as both were participating
in a joint venture or joint enterprise. Buquet v. St. Amant, 55
So. 2d 645 (La. App. 1951).
While the doctrine of joint enterprise is not new in the field
of automobile law, its purpose at its inception was in marked
contrast to the role it seems destined to assume. At the outset
the doctrine represented a partial revival of the rule of "imputed
negligence" as voiced by the classic English case of Thorogood
v. Bryan.' Under both doctrines the negligence of the driver is
imputed to the passenger on some theory of agency,2 but joint
enterprise is definitely an exception to the broad theory of negli-
gence which the Thorogood case represents. The great majority
23. Id. at 311.
1. 8 C.B. 115 (1849).
2. On the point that the basis of joint enterprise doctrine is some theory
of mutual agency, see Farthering v. Hepinstall, 243 Mich. 380, 220 N.W. 708
(1928); Bloom v. Leech, 120 Ohio St. 239, 166 N.E. 137 (1929); Robinson v.
Oregon-Washington R.R. & Nay. Co., 90 Ore. 490, 176 Pac. 594 (1918). Of
course, in all these cases no actual agency exists, for if one did exist there
would be no need to resort to a theory other than respondeat superior to
obtain the desired result.
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of the joint enterprise cases involve the right of the passenger
against a negligent third party, and the contributory negligence
of the driver is.imputed to the plaintiff as a bar to recovery. But
now, if the instant case and others4 throughout the United States
are of any significance, the courts have added the doctrine to
their growing list of theories upon which the owner of an auto-
mobile is held liable for the negligence of the driver. From its
role as a bar to recovery, the doctrine has now been employed
as a means to impose liability. If this be true, it only substanti-
ates to a greater degree the fact that the trend of decisions is to
secure, if possible, a solvent defendant to answer in damages to
the injured plaintiff.
Since the turn of the century, the havoc wrought upon the
highways of America by the modern motor vehicle has com-
pelled the courts to go to great lengths in employing fictions and
presumptions in an effort to afford just recompense for those
whose person or property is injured as a result of the negligent
operation of motor vehicles. The flood of negligence actions to-
gether with the frequent financial irresponsibility of the individ-
ual driving has led both the courts and state legislatures to
search for some basis of imposing liability upon the owner of the
vehicle. Since 1928 a majority of the states have adopted finan-
cial responsibility acts.5 The requirement for posting security
after the accident is usually mandatory, regardless of who is at
fault; thus time is not wasted in obtaining a fruitless judgment.
If the party cannot post the security or show evidence of insur-
ance, he loses his driver's license and car registration plates. The
stringency of this requirement has brought about a high per-
centage of voluntary insurance. Some states have adopted stat-
utes which make the owner of an automobile liable for all deaths
or injuries to persons or property resulting from the negligent
operation of his automobile by any person using it with his con-
3. Blashfleld, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law 1147 (1927): Mechem, The
Contributory Negligence of Automobile Passengers. 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 736,
747 (1930); Comment. 38 Yale L.J. 810 (1929): 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 597, 628 (1907);
48 A.L.R. 1055, 1077 (1927); 62 A.L.R. 440 (1929).
4. See Crescent Motor Co. v. Stone, 211 Ala. 516, 101 So. 49 (1924); Craw-
ford v. McElhinney, 171 Iowa 606, 154 N.W. 310 (1915); Roland v. Anderson,
282 S.W. 752 (Mo. App. 1926); Counts v. Thomas. 63 S.W. 2d 416 (Mo. App.
1933); Howard v. Zimmerman, 242 Pac. 131, 132 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
5. Only Mississippi and Louisiana have not yet adopted acts of this type.
However, the Mississippi legislature is now considering such an act and it is
understood that one will be presented to the Louisiana legislature this spring.
6. For a summary of states having such a statute, see 42 A.L.R. 898
(1926), 74 A.L.R. 951 (1931), 96 A.L.R. 634 (1935).
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sent. A few states7 have achieved comparable results by stat-
Utes which make the car itself liable up to its value at a sheriff's
sale for all accidents caused by its negligent operation on the
public highways of the state.
The common law "family purpose" doctrine 8 imposes lia-
bility on the head of a family when the car is being used by one
of the members of the family for the purpose for which it is
furnished. The same result has been achieved in Louisiana by
'the "community errand" doctrine and by Article 2318 of the
Louisiana Civil Code. The "community errand" doctrine since
Brantley v. Clarkson9 holds the husband liable for the torts of
his wife regarding automobile accidents which occur within
the scope of community affairs, which the court said included
errands whether for wholesome recreation and pleasure or for
other purposes consonant with the intangible and imponderable
obligations of the marital relationship. Article 2318 imposes
liability upon the parents for the torts of their minor or uneman-
cipated children residing with them and has effectively placed
the parent's solvency behind the wrongs of their minors.
The recent Illinois case of Ostergard v. Frisch0 illustrates
another tendency of the court to hold the owner liable. Defen-
dant's car was stolen, and in the getaway the thief negligently
drove into and injured the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the owner of
the automobile and was awarded damages. The court decided
that a statute which required defendant to remove the keys and
lock the automobile was designed to include plaintiff's interest
in personal safety within its protective ambit, aind also that the
statute was designed to protect this interest from the risk of
injury through the negligent operation of the motor vehicle by
the thief. While the Louisiana court of appeal in the case of
Castay v. Katz and Besthoif" refused to extend the owner's lia-
bility this far, 2 the Ostergard case shows the extent to which a
court might go in statutory interpretation in an effort to impose
7. See S.C. Code 1942, § 8792; Williams' Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, § 2682:
8. See Hope, The Doctrine of the Family Automobile, 8 A.B.A.J. 359
(1922); Note, 38. Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1925); Note, 12 Ore. L. Rev. 72 (1932);
Note, 14 Texas L. Rev. 234 (1936); Note, 39 Yale L.J. 1058 (1930); Benton v.
Regesser, 20 Ariz. 273, 179 Pac. 966 (1919); Richardson v. Weiss, 152 Minn.
391, 188 N.W. 1008 (1922); King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 396 (1918).
9. 217 La. 425, 46 So. 2d 614 (1950).
10. 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N.E. 2d 537 (1948), noted in 10 LoulslINA LAW
REVIEW 554 (1950).
11. 148 So. 76 (La. App. 1933).




liability upon the owner of the automobile. All the courts seem
to feel that since automobiles are expensive the owner is more
likely to be able to pay for damage than the person driving and
that he is the obvious person to carry the necessary insurance to
cover, the risk.
The decision reached by the court in the instant case is
undoubtedly sound. However, most courts' s in a situation of this
sort have applied principles of agency to hold the owner liable.
The Restatement of Torts14 says in effect that the fact that a
person is owner of a car which he permits another to drive does
not make the journey during which the other drives a joint
enterprise, although his ownership may be important in other
particulars. It may give the owner a peculiar ability to control
the manner in which the driver operates the car. If the purpose
of the journey is for the benefit of the owner, even though it is
also for the benefit of him who is permitted to drive, the owner
under principles of agency is regarded as master of the driver
even though no wages or reward other than the participation in
the drive is paid to him. It has been stated1" that where an owner
occupies the car at the time of the accident he is liable for the
negligence of the driver if (1) he has not abandoned his right to
control the car or (2) if he exercises or has a right to exercise
any control over the driver or the operation of the car, or (3) if
the ride is for his benefit or for the mutual benefit of himself
and the driver. An examination of the language of the court in
the Buquet case would lead one to the conclusion that the case
falls within the scope of the law of agency.
The extension of joint enterprise to this type situation
would seem to be justified in view of the court's trend toward
effectuating worthwhile public policy. But one might question
the propriety of the application of the doctrine to the factual
situation involved in the Buquet case. By the decided weight of
authority, two elements must appear to constitute a joint enter-
prise. There must be both (1) a community of interest in the
object of the trip and (2) a mutual right of control over the
operation of the vehicle.10 By mutual right of control is meant
13. See C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, 1053, § 428(b) (presence of owner).
14. Restatement, Torts, 1276, § 491(h) (1938).
15. 5 Blashfleld, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice 66-70, § 2930
(perm. ed. 1935).
16. 45 C.J. 1031-1032, § 588; Pope v. Halpern, 193 Calif. 168, 223 Pac. 470
(1924); Cunningham v. City of Thief River Falls, 84 Minn. 21, 86 N.W. 763
(1901); Russo v. Aucoin, 7 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 1942).
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that there is an understanding between the parties that each will
have an equal right in the direction and management of the
vehicle. It is the writer's belief that the mutual right of control
upon which the orthodox view of joint enterprise places such
great emphasis is not present in the Buquet case. Thus the theory
is objectionable here because it inferentially suggests that if the
position of the occupants were reversed, the negligence of the
owner-driver would be imputed to his friend and it is doubtful
that any such conclusion was intended by the court.
Garner R. Miller
